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amended.

The district court denied appellants1 motion by Order dated
February 14, 1975.

On March 11, 1975, Appellants filed a Peti-

tion for Intermediate Appeal,

On March 12, 1975, Respondent

filed a Motion to Amend its Complaint to include other equitable
remedies available under the factual circumstances of this case*
Respondent's Motion to Amend was granted by the Court on April
22, and its Amended Complaint was subsequently filed.

The. Appel-

lants declined to answer the Amended Complaint by disregarding or
applying a different interpretation to Rule 7(b)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which designates that a minute entry of
the Court, as applied to this case, is considered a formal order.
The Appellants declined to answer Respondent's Amended Complaint
initially on the basis that a formal order had not been prepared
and signed by the Court, and later, after the Intermediate Appeal
had been granted on April 30, 1975, on the grounds that the trial
court had lost jurisdiction.

Respondent takes the position that

the appellants should have filed their answer to the Amended Complaint and are dilatory for not so doing.

The causes of action

as set forth in the respondent's Amended Complaint (R.32) will
also be argued.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
One can only appreciate the rights claimed by the Respondent
to the waters of Lost Lake Reservoir if viewed in a historical
perspective.

The following statement of facts in addition to the

following arguments will be supported by reference to documents
on file in the State Engineer's office of which' the Court can
take judicial notice.

McGary v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d

288 (1948); American Fork Irrigation Company v. Linke, 121 Utah
90, 239 P.2d Digitized
188 by(1951)
.Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
the Howard W.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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On December 4, 1930, Application 2077-E was assigned to
Provo City by the Provo Reservoir Company.

The application gave.

Provo City the right to enlarge Lost Lake Reservoir and to appropriate 960 acre-ft. of water.

(Note:

Throughout the brief

mention is made of three (3) different figures concerning the
amount of water in Lost Lake; they are (1) 960 acre-ft.—the
amount of the original application 2077-E-l, (2) 799 acre-ft.—
the amount for which Provo City submitted proof, based upon the
year 1940, and (3) 784 acre-ft.—the approximate amount that was
historically used from Lost Lake Reservoir).

Application 2077-E

was segregated on December 14, 1931, and designated 2077-E-l to
distinguish the rights between Provo City and the Provo Reservoir
Company to the waters of Lost Lake Reservoir.

Construction on

the dam was completed on October 22, 1931, at a cost to Provo
City of approximately $25,000.00.

The initial attempts at

storing 960 acre-ft. were unsuccessful as the U.S. Forest Service
determined that the reservoir would only hold 799 acre-ft.
without creating a possible hazard.

From 1932 to 1974, Provo

City stored and beneficially used the following amounts of water
from Lost Lake Reservoir:
WATER STORAGE IN LOST LAKE
(1)1932—532 acre-ft.

(1)1933—634 acre-ft.

(2)1934—784 acre-ft.

1935—756 acre-ft.

1936—784 acre-ft.

1937—784 acre-ft.

1938—784 acre-ft.

1939—741 acre-ft.

1940—799 acre-ft.

1941—784 acre-ft.

1942 — 784 acre-ft.

1943—784 acre-ft.

1944—784 acre-ft.

1945—784 acre-ft.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1946—784 acre-ft.

1947—784 acre-ft.

1948—784 acre-ft.

1949—784 acre-ft.

1950—784 acre-ft.

1951—784 acre-ft.

1952—784 acre-ft.

1953—784 acre-ft.

1954—784 acre-ft.

1955—784 acre-ft.

1956—784 acre-ft.

1957—784 acre-ft.

1958—784 acre-ft.

1959—784 acre-ft.

1960—784 acre-ft.

(3)1961—545 acre-ft.

1962—784 acre-ft.

1963—784 acre-ft.

1964—784 acre-ft.

(4)1965—711 acre-ft.

1966—711 acre-ft.

1967—711 acre-ft.

1968—711 acre-ft.

(5)1969—321 acre-ft.

1970—321 acre-ft.

1971—321 acre-ft.

1972—321 acre-ft.

1973—321 acre-ft.

1974—321 acre-ft.
The following footnotes apply to those years when an amount
less than 784 acre-ft. was stored.
(1) U.S. Forest Service would not allow Reservoir to fill
so that checks could be made as to the construction of the dam
and possible leaks.
(2) Water stored but released by Provo River Commissioner
to satisfy prior rights because of low water.
(3)

Low water year.

(4) Decision to limit storage due to settling of dam to a
point that a sufficient lap surface was not available for 784
acre-ft. of storage.
(5) Decision to limit storage to 321.78 acre-ft. covered by
Certificate of Appropriation No. 3686.
The above figures are taken from the Provo River Commissioner' s annual reports, which are records of the State Engineer
and documents of which this Court can take judicial notice.
- 4J.-Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In 1932, Provo City filed Application a-1187 allowing the
City to change the point of diversion and use of 960 acre-ft. of
Lost Lake Storage Water from irrigation to domestic and municipal
use.

Lost Lake Waters were to be released into the Provo River

and diversions for municipal use were to be made from Bridal Veil
Falls and Lost Creek.

This Application was originally protested

by Utah Power and Light, but a subsequent contract between Provo
City and Utah Power and Light provided that Provo City would supply storage water to Utah Power and Light in exchange for the water
from Bridal Veil Falls and Lost Creek.

Provo City then began to

divert water from Bridal Veil Falls and Lost Creek under Applicaton
a-1187.
Provo City requested additional extensions of time for proof
of beneficial use under applications 2077-E-l and a-1187 until
October 5, 1942.

The reason for this delay was to try to submit

proof on the largest quantity of water possible and accordingly
the proof of 1940 for 799 acre-ft. was submitted.
After Provo City's proof of beneficial use on 799 acre-ft.
was submitted on October 5, 1942, no further action was taken by
the State Engineer's office until 1948. On May 3, 1949, the
State Engineer issued Certificate No. 3686 for the erroneous
amount of 321.78 acre-ft., contrary to the proof submitted.
This is an interesting sidelight that should be commented on.
In this action the State Engineer and the Intervenors allege that
the respondent should have filed an action against the State Engineer within sixty (60) days after the issuance of Certificate No.
3686, yet the State Engineer waited over six (6) years before he
ever returned Provo City's proof of beneficial use with the erroDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. •Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU.
- 5 .
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

neous calculations.

The prejudicial nature of such a delay was

manifest by the fact that Provo City's Engineer, who had prepared
the proof of beneficial use had been replaced and was unavailable
to counsel the City in regard to errors made by the State Engineer.
The main problem concerning Certificate of Appropriation No.
3686 is the inclusion of Applications 10547 and 10586.

These

Applications were originally filed by Orem City to appropriate
water from Bridal Veil Falls and Lost Creek.

They were rejected

by the State Engineer, but subsequent negotiations resulted in an
agreement whereby the applications were assigned to Provo City
with Orem retaining a one-seventh (1/7) interest.

They were rein-

stated by the Court on March 22, 1938, and eventually became confused with Application a-1187 because the sources of water to be
used were identical and they were all based on exchanges for storage water.

The main differences between the applications is that

a-1187 had already been in effect for six (6) years in conjunction
with Application 2077-E-l while Applications 10547 and 10586 did
not refer to Lost Lake Waters but to Deer Creek Reservoir waters
which were not available when the applications were filed. Applications 10547 and 10586 should never have been included with
Application 2077-E-l.
The mistakes and misunderstandings concerning Application
2 077-E-l apparently became moot when the State Engineer, through
his agent the Provo River Commissioner, continued to deliver 784
acre-ft. of water to Provo City contrary to Certificate No. 3686
which allowed only 321.78 acre-ft.

(See the above statistics

taken from the Provo River Commissioners reports).

Here again,

the respondent must respectfully attack the position taken by the
-6-
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State Engineer and Intervenors who claim that Provo City was
dilatory in not bringing this action within sixty (60) days,—the
State Engineer waited over twenty (20) years before he himself
ever recognized Certificate Ho, 3686,
The actual controversy before the Court began in 1969 when
the State Engineer reduced the amount of water allowed to be
stored by Provo City in Lost Lake Reservoir from 784 acre-ft. to
321.7 8 acre-ft.

At that time, Provo City was at a loss to under-

stand why the reduction was made or why Certificate No. 3686
limited it to 321.78 acre-ft.

Shortly thereafter, Provo City

made a complete audit of its records and the records of the State
Engineer concerning Application 2077-E-l and became aware of the
errors made by the State Engineer in issuing Certificate No.
3686.

City officials tried to approach the State Engineer and

members of his staff to consider the mistakes made in issuing
Certificate No. 3686 and to correct the error, but these efforts
were disregarded.
Provo City then filed this action against the State Engineer
to correct Certificate No. 3686 or to allow it to submit an
additional proof of appropriation.

The Intervenors, who have

never used this water and have no right or claim to it, were made
parties by the lower court.

It should be noted that none of the

Intervenors claim that the water is theirs or that they have a
use for it.

They are only arguing a technicality of the law.

Provo City spent approximately $10,000.00 in the summer of
1974 to repair the dam at Lost Lake Reservoir thereby assuring
the ability to store and use the water which is now in dispute.
These expenditures were made with the implied consent of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
• Library,
. - 7 -J. .Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State Engineer's office and the understanding that an agreement
would be reached whereby Provo City could use the full 784 acreft. of water.

This expense and effort has now also been held for

naught by the State Engineer.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks a remand to the district court to allow the
parties to present their evidence and to determine the matter on

,

the merits.
POINT I
THE APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM DENYING RESPONDENT ITS FULL
RIGHT TO THE WATERS OF LOST LAKE RESERVOIR.
Mention has already been made of the delay and inaction of
the State Engineer1s office from 1942 to 1948 on the "proof of
beneficial use" submitted by Provo City in 1942.

|
i

Such inaction

in itself constitutes laches and prejudiced the respondent's

I

position.
It is difficult to reconstruct the events that actually took
place when Certificate No. 3686 was actually issued in 1949, but

|
i

it is certain that Provo City officials could not have been aware
of the total impact of the certificate because the City was still

I

receiving 784 acre-ft. of water from Lost Lake Reservoir instead
of the 321.78 acre-ft. evidenced by the Certificate.

In effect,

the State Engineer was saying,--"Here is your Certificate for

|
i

321.78 acre-ft., but don't worry about it, we have given you and
will still give you 784 acre-ft. out of Lost Lake Reservoir"—and
such was the case as the State Engineer continued to allow Provo
i

City to use 784 acre-ft. of water from the reservoir until 1969.
For twenty (20) years the State Engineer stood by and delivered
-8- ...

.
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,

784 acre-ft. of water to Provo City and then in 1969 he took the
position that Provo City had lost its right to appeal his (a
different engineer's) decision.
The elements of estoppel as accepted by this Court in Migliaccio v. Davis, 232 P.2d 195, 120 Utah 1, are as follows:
1

. . . equitable estoppel or estoppel in
pais is the principle by which a party who
knows or should know the truth is absolutely
precluded, both at law and in equity, from
denying or asserting the contrary of, any
material fact, which, by his words or conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally
or through culpable negligence, he has induced another, who was excuseably ignorant
of the true facts and who had a right to rely upon such words and conduct, to believe
and act upon them thereby, as a consequence
reasonably to be anticipated, changing his
position in such a way that he would suffer
injury if such denial or contrary assertion
were allowed.'
With respect to water law in general this Court has approvingly quoted the following:
According to Hutchins, Selected Problems
In the Law of Water Rights in the West,
p. 402, rights may be lost f. . . by appropriates who by there inequitable conduct,
by acts and declarations, have led others
to make use of their water rights on the
assumption that such use would be entirely
legal. Appropriaters whose conduct has
been such are subsequently estopped from
asserting their own rights.1 Wellsville
East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay Land Co.,
104 Utah 448, 137 P.2d 634 (1943)
The actions of the State Engineer, in (1) delaying action on
the proof of appropriation submitted by Provo City, and (2) continuing to grant Provo City the right to use the amount of water
upon which proof was submitted, estop him from now saying that
the right is less than what he represented it to be by his
actions at that time.

Provo City relied upon the acts or omis-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

sions of the State Engineer.

He should not now be allowed to

reverse his position.

I

It is also a well accepted principal that governmental

1

departments such as the State Engineer's office can be estopped
to prevent injustice if the necessary elements or grounds of
estoppel are present.

I

Shafer v. State, 521 P.2d 736, 83 Wash.2d

618 (1974), City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423, 91

I

Cal.Rptr. 23 (1970), Crawford v. Mclaughlin, 473 P.2d 725, 172

j

Colo. 366 (1970), Silver City Consolidated School District No. 1 v.
Board of Regents of New Mexico Western College, 401 P.2d 95, 75

I

N.M. 106 (1965) . The later case endorses the principle of
equitable estoppel as between a public agency and a governmental

I

subdivision.

I

The Appellants are estopped from claiming a sixty (60) day
statute of limitations as a bar to this claim, and it is Respon-

I

dent's position that title to the waters of Lost Lake Reservoir
has vested in the citizens of Provo.

I

POINT II

I

THE ACTION OF THE STATE ENGINEER IN ISSUING A CERTIFICATE OF
APPROPRIATION IS NOT A "DECISION" WITHIN THE MEANING OF U.C.A.

I

§73-3-14 AND §73-3-15.
Title 73 chapter 3 of U.C.A. 1953, as amended, sets forth

•

the requirements necessary for a party to appropriate waters
within the state of Utah.

I

The first sections of said chapter

(section 73-3-1 through 73-3-7) outline the procedure for filing

|

both applications to appropriate and also protests to said
applications.

The next sections (73-3-8 through 73-3-10) deal

v/ith approval or rejection of said applications.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
.•'.,'•
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I

The next

I
.

I

sections (73-3-11 through 73-3-13) are provisions governing the
applicants completing the proposed construction necessary for the
appropriation.

Then sections 73-3-14 and 73-3-15 set forth the

provisions governing review of decisions made by the State
Engineer affecting applications, not certificates of appropriation.
The certificate of appropriation and its significance is set
forth after the sections governing review of the engineer's
decisions (sections 73-3-16 and 73-3-17).
In support of this interpretation are several arguments.
(1) If the issuance of a certificate of appropriation is a
"decision" as stated by the appellants, its issuance must also
comply with the provisions of section 73-3-14.

It states in

part:
In any case where a decision of the state
engineer is involved any person agrieved by
such decision may within 60 days notice
thereof"bring a civil action in the district
court for a plenary review thereof. The
state engineer shall give notice of his
decision by mailing a copy thereof by regular mail to the applicant and to each
protestant and notice shall be deemed to
have been given on the date of mailing.
(emphasis added)
Applying the above section and following the appellants line
of reasoning, every time a certificate of appropriation is issued,
a copy, letter, or memorandum must be sent to each of the parties
who protested the application.

This, of course, is not the

procedure outlined by the statutes or followed by the State Engineer's office.

Section 73-3-17, which describes the procedure

involved in issuing a certificate of appropriation states the
following:
. . . One copy of such certificate shall be
-11-
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filed in the office of the State Engineer
and the other shall be delivered to the
appropriator or to the person making the
change . . .
Section 73-3-14 states that copies of the decision must be
sent to protestors while section 73-3-17 says that only two
copies are to be made, one for the State Engineer and one for the
appropriator.

These sections are clearly irreconcilable if, as

the appellants claim, section 73-3-14 applies to 73-3-17.

The

appellant's position would also give the protestants to an application another opportunity for judicial review.

The first being

a review of the decision to approve the application and the
second being a review of the decision to issue the certificate of
appropriation.

Again this is clearly not the procedure outlined

by the statutes of this state nor followed by the State Engineer's
office in administering water rights.
(2)

Since the protestants never receive notice of the

issuance of a Certificate of Appropriation how can they possibly
protest it?

Section 73-3-14 cannot possibly apply to the issuance

of a Certificate of Appropriation.
(3)

In addition to the fact that the protestants never

receive notice of the issuance of a certificate, the issuance of
a certificate to the appropriator is a good deal different than
notice of a "decision11 of the State Engineer/
A "decision" of the State Engineer involving an application
has historically and always included language, such as the following, to warn the parties of their rights:
"This decision is subject to the provisions
of 73-3-14, U.C.A., 1953, which provides for
plenary review by the filing of a civil action in the appropriate district court within 60 days from the day hereof. (See appendix
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A for an example of a decision of the State
Engineer. See page 2, of Appendix A, next
to the last paragraph, for the above language. )
In contrast, whenever a certificate of appropriation is issued, no such language is used nor is there an accompanying letter
to that affect.

The result is that the appropriator is never warn-

ed of his rights of review.

To the knowledge of the respondent,

the State Engineer has never before in any other case contended
that the issuance of a certificate was notice of his "decision",
nor has the engineer in any other case known to the respondent failed to issue a "decision" in his customary manner.

In this case,

the theory adopted by the engineer is a deviation from a uniform
application of the law and would seem to the respondent to violate Article 1, Section 2 of the Utah State Constitution which requires the law to be uniformly applied, and further, it is unconstitutional under the "equal protection" clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The above reasons demonstrate clearly that any argument
asserting that §73-3-14 and §73-3-15 are applicable to §73-3-17
must fail.
POINT III
A CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIATION IS ONLY PRIMA FACIA EVIDENCE
OF THE FACTS CERTIFIED AND ITS VALIDITY IS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW.
The appellants hold as inviolate the representations of a
Certificate of Appropriation.

The statute describes a Certi-

ficate of Appropriation as prima facia evidence of the holders
right.

(Section 73-3-17 Utah Code Annotated, 1953),

This Court

has stated that in the determination of water rights a CertifiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cate of Appropriation is "only prima facia evidence of the facts
certified".

United States v, District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238

P.2d 1132 (1951).
A case that deals directly with an attack on a Certificate
of Appropriation is Warren Irrigation Company v. Charlton et al.,
58 Utah 113, 197 P.2d 1030 C1921).

The case involves a subse-

quent appropriator (Charlton) who is diverting water to the
injury of the plaintiff (Warren Irrigation Company).

One of the

defendant's defenses was that the Certificate of Appropriation
relied upon by the plaintiff was "only prima facia evidence" of
the water right claimed.

This Court held that since the defen-

dant was "not in any sense a party to or interested in the proceeding concerning the application" which finally culminated in
the issuance of the certificate he could not collaterally attack
the Certificate of Appropriation held by the plaintiff.

The

Court stated, however, that the result would be different if the
party attacking the Certificate had had a direct interest in
the issuance of the Certificate.
. „ . We may go further by way of illustrating our views and suggest that,
if appellants had in any manner shown
themselves to be interested as contemplated appropriators of the water under
the state law, they might have had a
right of action in a direct proceeding
to cancel and annul the Certificate of
Appropriation on some equitable grounds
for cancellation. (Warren Irrigation
Company v. Charlton, supra, p. 1033).
(emphasis added)
The Court further stated that a comparison should be made
between Certificates of Appropriation for water and Patents
issued for public land.
[I]n
our
theLibrary,
question
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sented here should be determined by the
same rules and principles which control
in cases involving the effect given to
patents issued for public land by the
land department of the United States.
In Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 24
L.Ed. 848, the doctrine is well stated
in the second and third paragraphs of
the syllabus:
[2J. If there be any lawful reason why
the patent should be cancelled or rescinded, the appropriate remedy is by a
bill in chancery, brought by the United
States, but no executive officer is
authorized to reconsider the facts on
which it was issued and to recall or
rescind it or to issue one to another
party for the same track.
[3]. But when mistake or fraud or miscontraction of the law of the case exists,
the United States or any contesting claimant
for the land may have relief by a court of
equity, (emphasis added)
In Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 26
L.Ed. 875, the first and second paragraphs
of the syllabus read:
1. A patent, duly signed, counter-signed
and sealed, for public lands which, at
the time it was issued, the land department
had, under the statute, authority to convey, cannot be collaterally impeached in
an action at law; in the finding of the department touching the existance of certain
facts, with the performance of certain antecedent acts, upon which the lawful exercise of that authority may in a particular
case depend, cannot, in a court of law, be
questioned.
2. If in the issuing of a patent the officers
of that department take mistaken views of
the law, or draw erroneous conclusions from
the evidence, or act from either imperfect
views of duty or corrupt motives, the party
agrieved cannot set up such matters in a
court of law to defeat the patent. He must
resort to a court of equity where he can
obtain relief, if his rights are injuriously affected by the existence of the patent,
and he possesses such equities as will conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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trol the legal title vested in the patentee.
A stranger to the title cannot complain of
the act of the government in regard thereto."
(Italics ours.)
The court states definitely that an action to review the
issuance of a Certificate of Appropriation is acceptable and
proper in a court of equity.

Provo City is not a stranger to the

title of this water and has every right to present its' evidence
concerning the mistakes, errors, and misconstruction of law that
were involved in the issuance of Certificate No.3686.

In fact,

Provo City is entitled to have the State Engineer issue a "decision" within the meaning of §73-3-14 and §73-3-15 from which,
if contrary to its proof of appropriation, it could appeal.
POINT IV
ANY PROCEEDINGS OR DECISIONS OF THE STATE ENGINEER ARE
ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE AND DO NOT DETERMINE THE FINAL RIGHTS OF
THE RESPONDENT.
If, as the appellants claim, the issuance of a Certificate
of Appropriation is a "decision" of the State Engineer, it would
still not preclude the respondent from bringing an action to enjoin interference with its water right.

This Court has discussed

several times the nature and effect of the administrative proceedings before the State Engineer.
The case of Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P.2d 362, 365,
366 (1938), is probably the best discussion of how water rights are
actually determined.

There it is pointed out that the proceedings

before the State Engineer, the district court, and even the Supreme
Court with respect to approving an application are not determinative
of the relative rights of the parties to the use of water theretofore
appropriated.
A decision of the State Engineer or a court order apDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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proving an application only gives the new appropriator the right
to proceed with the construction of his project.

If, after the

project is completed or any time thereafter, it appears that the
new appropriation is interfering with prior rights, the prior appropriators would not be precluded from bringing an independent
action to enjoin the diversion of their waters. Thus a "decision"
of the State Engineer would be subject to judicial review years
after the sixty (60) day period had expired.

[See also United

States v. District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 P.2d 1132, 1135 (1951)].
The only purpose of a sixty (60) day time limitation in which,
the decision of the State Engineer can be reviewed is to prevent
any legal interference after the sixty (60) day period from those
who were protestants so that the applicant can proceed with his
project until completed.

Once, however, the project is completed,

the applicant is ..subject, at any time, to legal action if he interferes with the prior rights of others.

Such a procedure encour-

ages the development of the waters of this state without prejudicing the rights of prior appropriators.
This same principle was recently affirmed in a Ninth Circuit
case, United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (1974).

In that

action the National Park Service had protested the drilling of a
group of wells in Nevada near a National Monument area.

A hear-

ing was conducted by the State Engineer, at which the National
Park Service was present, and a decision resulted in the approval
of the drilling of the wells.

The United States did not appeal

the decision, but approximately a year later, when it became
obvious that the wells were interfering with the water in the Park
area, it brought an action to enjoin the defendants from pumping
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the water.

The State of Nevada intervened and argued that since

the United States had participated in the hearing and had not
appealed the matter, the decision of the State Engineer was res
judicata and the independent action could not be heard.

The

Ninth Circuit rejected that argument holding that the proceeding
before the State Engineer's office was an administrative proceeding and not determinative of the rights of the parties. The
applicant was, therefore, free to proceed and drill his wells and
try to perfect a right without interfering with others, but if he
drilled the wells and did interfere, then the remedy would be to
file an independent action to enjoin the applicants.

The Court

further stated:
Even if the United States had waived
its sovereign immunity, we are not bound
to give res judicata effect to the decision of an administrative body in a case
of this kind.
* As the Court said in Grose v. Kohen,
406 F.2d 823, 824 (4th Cir. 1969):
'Res judicata of administrative decisions
is not incrusted with a rigid finality
that characterizes the precept of judicial proceedings . . . Application of the
doctrine often serves a useful purpose in
preventing relitigation of issues administratively determined, . . . but pratical
reasons may exist for refusing to apply
it, e.g., United States v. Stone & Downer
Co., 270, 274 U.S. 225, [47 S.Ct. 616, 71
L.Ed. 1013] (1927). And in any event, when
traditional concepts of res judicata do
not work well, they should be relaxed or
qualified to prevent injustice. 2 Davis,
Administrative Law, §18.03 (1958).'
Even if this Court should find that the issuance of a
Certificate of Appropriation is a "decision", then the above
principles would afford respondent the opportunity to review that
decision since its rights have subsequently been interfered with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to its detriment.

Respondent has plead and properly alleged a

claim for injunctive relief (R. 36) and is entitled to a hearing.
Along this same line of reasoning, mention should be made of
the basic nature of water rights.

Historically the determination

of water rights have found exclusive jurisdiction in courts of
equity (§73-3-15 U.C.A. 1953).

Water rights are not inviolate

and necessarily stable as the appellants assert, but are subject
to constant judicial review.

Civil actions for abandonment or

forfeiture, (§73-1-4, U.C.A., 1953) and statutory.general adjudications (§73-4-1 and §73-4-18, U.C.A. 1953) continually reassess
and redetermine the rights of the litigants.
Presently there is a general statutory adjudication of all
water rights taking place in the Provo River-Utah Lake-Jordan
River drainage area entitled Salt Lake City v. Tamar Anderson,
106 Utah 350, 148 P.2d 346 (1944).

Anyone who holds a Certifi-

cate of Appropriation (including those issued within the last 72
years) will have it reviewed to see if it still represents the
true measure of the water right claimed.

If it does not, the

Certificate will be adjusted to reflect the present day use. Any
allegation or appeal to the effect that the stability of water
rights is necessary for proper administration is illusory as the
statutory general adjudication proceedings change those rights
frequently.

Water use and water rights are in a constant state

of flux and thus subject to judicial interposition.
POINT V
THE MUTUAL MISTAKES AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH OCCURRED IN
THE ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE NO. 3686 ARE EQUITABLE GROUNDS UPON
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT CAN RETAIN JURISDICTION.
-19-
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The principle that a court of equity can retain jurisdiction
of a cause of action alleging mistake is well accepted.
. . . Indeed, it has been said that the
granting of relief on this ground is one
of the most familiar functions of the
court, that mistake, equally with fraud,
is a ground for judicial interposition. . .
A mistake relievable in equity is said to
be some unintentional act, omission, or
error, arising from ignorance, surprise,
imposition, or misplaced confidence. . .
Accordingly, equity may and should always
intervene to prevent unjust enrichment
by a party, private or public, by virtue
of a mistake. The fact of mistake being
established, the court may, for example,
correct that which has been done by virtue of its process, divest a title which
has been acquired, or interpose to prevent
a forfeiture. 27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity, §28,
P. 552.
In the issuance of Certificate No. 3686 there were several
basic mistakes.
(1)

The first was the complete disregard or ignorance of

application a-1187 which was an integral part of application
2077-E-l.

Application a-1187 was approved in 1932 and was the

basis upon which Provo City diverted the waters from Lost Creek
and Bridal Veil Falls.
(2)

Applications 10547 and 10586 were in fact applications

based on an exchange with Deer Creek Reservoir water and are in
no way connected with the water of Lost Lake Reservoir nor were
they necessary for the proof of beneficial use submitted by Provo
City.
(3)

The provisions of a contract with Utah Power and Light,

which v/as also an intregal part of application a-1187, as well as
applications 10547 and 10586 v/ere disregarded.

The contract pro)

vision referred to allowed Provo City up to 30 days to deliver an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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equal amount of water to Utah Power and Light after it was diverted from Bridal Veil Falls and Lost Creek.

Provo City was not

credited for the delivery of this water.
There are other errors and mistakes which will be important
at an engineer's rehearing, if one is ordered, or at the trial
if this proceeding is allowed, which the respondent will not
discuss in depth at this time.

These mistakes, made by both the

State Engineer's office and Provo City officials, are easily
explained.

From 1930, when the appropriation began, to 1949,

when the certificate was issued, there were four (4) changes in
the office of the State Engineer as well as three (3) changes in
the office of the Provo City Engineer.

Especially prejudicial to

the rights of the respondent was a seven (7) year delay from
1942, when proof was submitted, to 1949, when certificate No.
3686 was issued.
The equitable principles of mutual mistakes come to bear
when both parties have entered into an agreement or arrived at a
resolution which is not in conformity with their real intent.
The real intent and proof of appropriation on application 2077-E1 is based upon application a-1187 and Provo City's historical use.
The State Engineer's intent is evidenced by his continual delivery of 7 84 acre-ft of water to Provo City.

The respondent has

alleged and pleaded mutual mistake (R. 33) and is entitled to a
judicial hearing upon that basis.
POINT VI
RESPONDENT HAS BEEN DEPRIVED OF A VALUABLE PROPERTY RIGHT
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW, A VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND ARTICLE I
. - 2 1J. Reuben
•• Clark Law School, BYU.
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SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The State Engineer's office in depriving Provo City of its
water has acted without any regard for due process.

The elements

of due process as they apply to administrative agencies, which
would include the State Engineer*s office, are set forth in
Fuller-Toponce Truck Company v. Public Service Commission, 99
Utah 28, 96 P.2d 722 (1939).

This case involved an action by the

plaintiff trucking company against the Public Service Commission,
which had cancelled and annulled a Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity previously granted to Fuller-Toponce.

The trucking

company complained that its right to due process had been violated by the administrative agencies actions and decisions.

This

Court held that the Public Service Commission had not deprived
Fuller-Toponce of due process, but in so deciding it set a standard by which to measure due process in regards to administrative
agencies.

The Court adopted a quote from 12 Am.Jur. §567-574, as

that legal encyclopedia existed at that time.
We read in section 573: "The essential
elements of due process of law are notice,
and an opportunity to be heard and to
defend in an orderly proceeding adapted
to the nature of the case before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause."
When Certificate No. 3686 was first issued in 1949, the
State Engineer, ex parte, and without formal notice or a hearing
reduced Provo City's proof from 799 acre feet to 321.78 acre
feet.

In July, 1969, v/hen the State Engineer deprived Provo City

of the use of any water above 321.78 acre feet, again there was
no formal notice or hearing.

Repeated attempts were made on an

informal basis between 1969 and 1973 by Provo City Officials to
present its evidence to the State Engineer, but a hearing or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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audience with the State Engineer was denied.

A formal petition

for a hearing before the State Engineer was made on May 26, 1975,
but the petition has apparently not been acted upon because of
the litigation now pending.
The root of this argument is that Provo City has never been
allowed to present its evidence to any type of administrative or
judicial body and yet it has already been deprived of a valuable
water right.

This is a clear constitutional violation.

All of

the deliberations and decisions have been made in the State
Engineer's office, without the participation of the respondent.
If the relief sought by the appellants is granted, the respondent
will have been deprived of its property without a hearing and
without due process.
POINT VII
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 73-3-1 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,'1953, DOES NOT PROHIBIT PROVO
CITY'S ACQUISITION OF THE WATERS OF LOST LAKE RESERVOIR BY ADVERSE POSSESSION.
The last sentence of §73-3-1 U.C.A. 1953 was added in 1939
and provides that no water rights can be acquired by adverse
possession.

Prior to 1939 it was recognized that water rights

could be obtained by adverse possession.

(Wellsville East Field

Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay, supra).
More recent judicial opinions have also held that water
rights initiated before 1939 qualified for appropriation by
adverse possession.

In re Drainage Area of Bear River in Rich

County, 12 U.2d 1, 361 P.2d 407 (1961), In re Use of Water within
Drainage Area of Green River, 12 Utah 2d 102, 363 P.2d 199 (1961).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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The elements of adverse possession are seven (7) years continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, notorious, and adverse enjoyment.
(Wellsville Eastfield Irrigation Company v. Lindsay, supra).
Provo City first began to divert and use the waters of Lost
Lake Reservoir in 1932.

(See table in statement of facts).

From

1932 to 1939, a period of eight (8) years, Provo City laid all
claim to the water exclusive of any other users.

The amount

diverted in the year, 1934, when the water was not used, can be
explained.

The year, 1934, was a dry year and many of the pri-

mary rights on the Provo River were not satisfied.

As such, the

secondary rights (of which Lost Lake was one) were not allowed to
use their full right.

This in itself was not an interruption of

the basic right because other secondary rights on the river were
also denied use of any water.
A case is also made for Provo City's acquistion of the water
right by adverse possession from 1940 to 1969 and especially from
1949 to 1969 when certificate No. 3686 was supposedly the measure
of the right.
It appears that the legislative and judicial intent of that
portion of section 73-3-1 U.C.A. which prohibits the acquisition
of water rights by adverse possession is based upon the following
reasons:
(1)

To have one statutory procedure by which a water right

can be perfected.
(2)

To alert the public or put on notice those that have an

interest in the waters of this state.
(3)

To prevent numerous claims against other parties1

water rights.
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(4)

The fact that adverse possession is difficult to prove

and the presumption is against it.
Respondent submits that if the above four reasons describe
the case against the doctrine of adverse possession then Provo
City should not be precluded from claiming the waters of Lost
Lake Reservoir by adverse use.

In response to each of the above

four (4) reasons it is submitted that:
(1)

Provo City complied with the stautory process but was

frustrated by the mistakes and delays encountered in the State
Engineer's office.
(2)

Notice was given upon application, and notice was given

for 37 years, 1932 to 1969, through the public records of the
Provo River Commissioner and the State Engineer's office.
(3)

Provo City is not claiming anyone else's water, it only

wants to reclaim its own.

This water has never been used by the

appellants or any other party.
(4)

The public records of the State Engineer's office show

the extent and use of the waters of Lost Lake Reservoir by Provo
City.

For this case no proof is required; Provo City has used

approximately 784 acre-ft. of water for 37 years.
There is no logical reason to prevent Provo City from acquiring title to the water of Lost Lake Reservoir by the theory
of adverse possession.
POINT VIII
THE ECONOMIC WASTE AND INEFFICIENT USE OF RESOURCES THAT
WOULD RESULT IF PROVO CITY IS NOT ALLOWED TO USE LOST LAKE RESERVOIR IS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY.
Provo City has invested over $50,000.00 in the construction
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j
and maintenance of Lost Lake Reservoir, with the majority of
those costs at 1932 prices.

I

At today's price levels the reser-

voir is an asset worth up to one-half of a million dollars.

I

Appellants now contend that a reservoir that will hold 784 acre
feet of water should only be allowed to hold 321.78 acre feet,

•

thereby wasting over half of the capacity of a valuable resource.

I

This court has repeatedly stated that the waters of this state
should be put to their fullest and most efficient use.

American

I

Fork Irrigation Company v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 239 P.2d 188
(1951), United States v. Caldwell, 64 Utah 490, 231 P. 434 (1924).

I

It is difficult to imagine that there should be any argument at

I

all as to what action would best serve the interests of the
taxpayers and citizens of this state.

I

The position of the appellant, Central Utah Water Conservancy District, in this regard is almost unbelievable.

Their

•

position is that Provo City should not be allowed to fill its

|

reservoir because they want to build their own Jordanelle Reservoir.

That type of reasoning probably makes sense if your

I

business is contracting the construction of reservoirs, but not
if you are responsible for the tax dollars of the public.
CONCLUSION

•
|

Provo City has proved that it can store and beneficially use
approximately 784 acre-ft. of water from Lost Lake Reservoir.

I

Provo City can also explain and prove to a trial court that
several mistakes were made in the issuance of Certificate of

•

Appropriation No. 3686.

I

The appellants are well aware of this

and for that reason they fear a judicial or administrative
hearing that would re-establish Provo Cityfs rights.
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They have

|

no factual or equitable leg to stand upon, but instead cling to a
legal shoestring that is destined to break from too much twisting
and turning.
For 37 years Provo City used the waters of Lost Lake Reservoir without any of the intervenors claiming that their rights
were infringed upon.

Only when Certificate No. 3686 raised its

ugly head in 1969 did the hue and cry go forth.

None of the

intervenors can presently show how they could possibly use the
waters of Lost Lake if Provo City did not.

The water would be

wasted as spring flood waters.
Respondent submits that this cause of action should be
remanded to the trial court for a hearing and a determination on
the merits.
Respectfully submitted,

JaoKcbn Howard, for:
HC^?ARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
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APPENDIX A

BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF CHANGE
APPL. NO. a-7739 (55-762)

)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Change Application No. a-7739 ('55-762 was filed by Provo City
Corporation to change the point of diversion of 10.0 sec. ft.
of water evidenced by Appl. No. 26902, Cert. No. 7798. The
water has been diverted from three wells located: (1) South
1150 feet and East 970 feet from the N% Cor. Sec. 1, T7S, R2E;
(2) North 1115 feet and East 823 feet from the S% Cor. Sec. 25,
T6S, R2E; and (3) South 47 9 feet and East 568 feet from the NW
r?^:r. Cor. Sec. 1, T7S, R2E, SLB&M; and has been used for municipal
purposes. Hereafter, it is proposed to divert the water from
points No. 1 and No. 2, same as heretofore, and in addition, a
new 20-inch well, 600 feet deep, at a point North 952.25 feet
and East 27.36 feet from the SW Cor. Sec. 7, T6S, R3E, SLB&M.
The water will be used the same as heretofore.
The change application was advertised in the Orem-Geneva Times
May 9 through May 23, 1974 and was protested by Kennecott Copper
Corporation. A hearing was held on the above-numbered change
application on February 25, 1975 in the Utah County Courthouse
in Provo, Utah. The applicant had not received the notice sent
by the State Engineer and was not represented at the hearing.
Provo River Water User's Association entered a protest after observing at the hearing. The protestant expressed concern that
the utilization of the well in immediate proximity to the Provo
River may interfere with their water rights. The well had been
drilled by Provo City under a temporary change application and
there were some indications that the well was not entirely successful; therefore, the question was raised at the hearing whether or
not Provo City was still interested in the well and what information had been developed through the drilling and testing of the
well.

.

Accordingly, Provo City was asked to submit data gathered during
the drilling and testing of the well, which they did. The well
log shows that the well was drilled to 469 feet through various
strata of clays and gravel. No appreciable water was found in the
first 200 feet, and water was added to the hole to facilitate
drilling the first 50 feet. The casing was perforated from 195
to 212 feet, from 222 to 337 feet and from 346 to 402 feet, but
the static water level was" at 225 feet, indicating low production
in the upper strata. The pump test yielded 1,032 gpm with 63.5
drawdown and 1,200 gpm with 66 feet drawdown. The water quality
is within acceptable limits of the Utah State Department of Health.
In view of the information that has been provided by Provo City
to the State Engineer and from his investigation into this matter,
it is the opinion of the State Engineer that the development from
by the
Howard W.
Huntersame
Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law on
School,the
BYU. drainage basin
the new pointDigitized
will
have
the
net
effect
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appendix A page 2
Change Appl. No. a-7739 (55-762)
Memorandum Decision
Page 2
as the existing well which will be abandoned. The static level
in the well indicates that it would have no effect upon Provo
River, and it appears that it will not cause any interference
with other rights in the area.
It is, therefore, ordered and Change Appl. No. a-7739 (55-762)
is hereby APPROVED subject to prior rights and with the following conditions:
1.

That no more water can be taken from the three points
of diversion than the 10.0 sec. ft. under the original
application.

2.

That the well be provided with a totalizing water meter
and that this meter shall be available to the State
Engineer or his representative at any reasonable time
as may be required for regulating the development.

This decision is subject to the provisions of Section 73-3-14,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides for plenary review by
the filing of a civil action in the appropriate district court
within sixty days from the date hereof.
Dated this 4th day of June, 1975.
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cc:

Kennecott
c/o James
P. 0. Box
Salt Lake

Copper Corporation
B. Lee
11898
City, Utah 84111

cc:

Provo River Water User's Association
c/o Joseph Novak
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

cc:

Provo River Water User's Association
84 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
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